Theses on Latin America

1) After a period of relative political stability and economic growth linked to the commodity boom, Latin America has returned to a new stage of grave economic crisis and great social and political turbulence. The basis of this new stage is the impact of the international capitalist crisis on the subcontinent. This is particularly linked to the slowdown in China but also reflects structural limits of the peripheral, dependent model of capitalism in the region.

2) At the same time there is a crisis of the political alternatives which capitalised on the popular opposition to imperialism over the last decade and a half. The experience of so-called progressive governments, of the centre left and even Bolivarian variety in various countries have reached their limits. Despite being very varied and different from each other, such as the cases of Lulaism in Brazil and Chavismo in Venezuela, none of these alternatives broke with the domination of capital. They were not therefore able to confront their own contradictions, and overcome the economic model based on raw material exploitation or confront the deep international crisis.

3) The crisis of these governments could open the way to new alternatives on the Left capable of learning the lessons of their mistakes, limits and betrayals. This is the role of the CWI and its Latin American sections. However, this process of reorganisation of the Left is still very incipient. The main characteristic of the current moment in the region is the growth of right wing political forces. It is in this scenario that we have to struggle to recompose the forces of revolutionary socialism.

 

Crisis of the centre-Left and turn to the right

4) This is the scenario in the key countries of the region. In November 2015 we saw the election of Macri to the Presidency of Argentina. A few days later in Venezuela (December 2015) the right wing opposition won a big majority in the National Assembly which led the country to a great political impasse. In 2016 there was the rise of Temer, armed with a hard neoliberal programme, to the Presidency of Brazil via a parliamentary coup manoeuvre which brought down Dilma Rousseff of the PT after 13 years in power. The municipal elections of this year in Brazil were also marked by growth of the right wing parties together with the fall of the PT.

5) This advance of the right wing was not only at the expense of governments considered “progressive”, but also took place within the existing governments which almost invariably took or deepened a turn to the right in their policies. This turn to the right of the “progressive” governments only served to deepen their crises, confuse their social base and open a space for  the most explicit and aggressive right.

6) In Argentina for example, the candidate supported by Cristina Kirchner, the businessman and ex-Buenos Aires governor, Daniel Scioli, symbolised the conservative turn of Kirchnerism, making its defeat by the right wing Macri even more demoralising.

7) The case of Brazil is even more emblematic. Dilma was re-elected in 2014 with a rhetoric warning of the risks of the hard neo-liberalism of her PSDB rival, Aécio Neves, were he to win. Then after her re-election Dilma she assumed the neo-liberal programme of her adversary applying fiscal austerity, privatisations and cuts to workers and social rights. The popular discrediting of her and the PT which followed opened the way for the collapse of the government and the coup manoeuvres of the right.

 

Desgaste dos governos “bolivarianos” na Bolívia e Equador

8) In Bolivia, this process already led to the first electoral defeat for Evo Morales since winning power in 2006. He was defeated in the referendum held in February which would give him the chance to run again for re-election. After the extreme social and political polarisation of the first decade of the century, with the water and gas “wars” and the open confrontation with the reactionary right wing of the eastern “media luna” region, Morales thought he could calm the right wing opposition by offering concessions and incorporating right wing sectors into his governing party.  .

9) In implementing this path, Morales confronted strong working class popular and indigenous resistance, for example against the rise in fuel costs (2010) or the attempt to build a motorway through the TIPNIS indigenous territory in the west in 2011. In 2013, it was the workers movement that waged a struggle against the new Pensions Law, including a general strike called by the COB.

10) The government managed to defeat the workers, and at the same time to dismantle the project to build a Workers’ Party through the COB. In eliminating potential counter-currents from the Left, Morales achieved that only the right wing could capitalise on the discontent with his government. His defeat in the referendum opens up uncertainty in relation to the future of the Bolivian MAS. In its favour is the fact that the crisis has still not reached dimensions in Bolivia as in other countries, and the fact that the right wing opposition is still weak and fragmented. Both these factors can be reversed in the next period though.

11) A similar process is taking place in Ecuador. President Rafael Correa, who won power after a great mass movement and the bringing down of two Presidents, is now losing support from sections of the organised working class and indigenous populations. The indigenous movements organised in the CONAIE, as well as other social movements broke from the government some time ago.

12) More recently the decision of the government to attack and practically dissolve the National Union of Ecuadorians, by illegalising the union, provoked even greater repudiation of the government by parts of the union movement. Correa declared that he would not contest the next elections in February 2017 and after 10 years in power his governing alliance is now at risk.

 

Psuedo-Left in Nicaragua and Peru

13) When the prestige of Venezuelan Chavismo was growing, some sectors moved towards the “Bolivarian” model in the quest for political power in their countries. In some cases, these political forces were born in a deformed manner, opening up the path for the return of the right wing, as in Peru. In others, they moved sharply to the right, as in Nicaragua.

14) In Peru, the neo-liberal reactionary right returned to power in 2016, after an experience of government by a variant of centre-left nationalism. The ex-army officer from the Nationalist Party, Ollanta Humala, was elected as President in 2011 with the expectation that he would be a Peruvian Hugo Chavez. In government, however, he adopted a policy far closer to Lula than to Chavez, and served the interests of the big mining companies and big capital.

15) The result was that Humala lost popular support and opened the way for a right wing counter-offensive. He ended up not supporting any candidate for his succession. The candidate mire linked with the Left finished in third place and the second round of the elections in June, was between two candidates of the neo-liberal right, the daughter of the dictator Alberto Fujimori, Keiko Fujimori, and the ex-banker and man of bug business Pedro Pablo Kuczynski. The latter emerged the winner.

16) In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas who returned to power in 2007 are only a deformed caricature of the old FSLN which led the revolution of 1979. Daniel Ortega has just won his third Presidential election on 6 November. However, he was almost unopposed in the elections, both from the right and the Left, and his victory was marked by an authoritarian abuse of power by Ortega.

17) Ortega he did not hesitate to use authoritarian methods to eliminate opopsition, but this does not mean that these  measures were intended to strengthen Left measures against the local bourgeoisie and imperialism. Quite the opposite. Despite his international alignment with the “bolivarian” governments and frequent skirmished with the US, Ortega’s administration has been one of conservatism, alliance with big business and old oligarchies and the abandonment of any minimally Left programme.

 

Chile: Bachelet prepares the way for the return of the Pinochetist right wing?

18) Chile already had one experience of right wing government of a Pinochetist origin, with Sebastián Piñera, who governed between 2010 and 2014. Piñera was elected on the basis of the decline of the Michelle Bachelet government of the Socialist Party and the Concertacion coalition which ruled Chile, with conservative and neoliberal policies, since Pinochet’s withdrawal.

19) Bachelet had to adopt a slightly more Left profile in order to win the elections again in 2014, this time as part of the “New Majority” which had incorporated the Communist Party. Her government has continued along the line of “moderation”, with small cosmetic changes which do not address the main demands of the movements in defence of public education, social services etc.

20) One of the features of the conjuncture in Chile is the mass dissatisfaction which has been reflected in mass actions and struggles, such as the mobilisations of the No + AFP movement, which the CWI Chilean section has an intense participation in, and the struggles of the youth for the right to public education.

21) This led Bachelet to a bad result in in the municipal elections this year, and is leading to a nebulous horizon for the 2017 Presidential elections. A return of the most explicit right wing to power cannot be ruled out.

 

Honduras and Paraguay: precedents of institutional coups

22) The experience of the coups which were launched in Honduras and Paraguay, despite being isolated processes in small countries, is still important to understand the dynamic of what the local ruling class and imperialism could try to do in order to guarantee governments which are fully in line with their interests.

23) In Honduras in 2009, a manoeuvre of the National Congress and Judicial Power, in the midst of a declaration of a state of exception, led to the elected President, Manuel Zelaya, being brought down. This was in order to prevent him from initiating a popular consultation about forming a Constituent Assembly, along the lines of what had been done in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador.

24) The bringing down of Zelaya opened the way for more social conflict, while the most hard-line neo liberal right wing, allied with imperialism, managed to impose its policy. A conservative government led by Porfirio Lobo was formed following elections which were not recognised by the majority of international organisations and countries in Latin America and Europe, but which later consolidated itself.

25) The other case of institutional coup was carried out in Paraguay in 2012, when Fernando Lugo, a centre-Left ex-catholic bishop, who despite implementing a moderate programme, was removed from his position in a totally arbitrary impeachment process. The processm initiated by the parliament, lasted only 48 hours. The official justification of his removal was “weak execution of his role” as President.

26) Both in Honduras and Paraguay, these institutional coups opened the way for repressive measures and more hard neoliberal policies. However, they were also processes in which those responsible sought to maintain the appearance of democratic “normality”. These experiences were useful for the ruling class, the right wing and imperialism in the case of Brazil and could still serve their interests in other countries.

 

The end of the Lula/PT cycle in Brazil

27) Dilma Rousseff was temporarily removed from office on 12 May 2016, after the Senate voted to begin the process of impeachment. The same vote had already taken place, with a large majority in favour in the Congress on 17 April. The definitive removal of Dilma took place in a plenary of the Senate on 31 August. The Fall of Dilma marked the end of the cycle of the PT in government, which begun under Lula in 2002, and of its project of social pacts and class collaboration.

28) The option to bring down Rousseff was not immediately supported by the ruling class and right wing parties. Their preferred option was to pressurise the PT to do their dirty work in implementing unpopular austerity and eventually remove it from government in a less tumultuous manner in 2018 elections. A year before Dilma’s removal, the main bosses’ organisation in the country and the main media companies, as well as the main bankers association, publicly announced their position against the impeachment. The sharpening of the economic crisis then led them to demand more extreme measures.

29) Dilma threw her “anti-neoliberal” rhetoric in the bin immediately after her re-election in 2014. She did everything possible to prove to the ruling class her commitment to counter reforms and fiscal austerity. The PT government in 2015 deepened the recession, increased rates, cut spending, intensified privatisations and presented to congress a series of proposals for labour, fiscal and pension counter-reforms. It also supported and negotiated a PSDB proposal in parliament to open up oil exploitation to private companies.

30) However, it was not enough. The more she accepted the programme of the right wing opposition, the more support she lost from her support base without guaranteeing the support of the ruling class, or the cooperation of the right wing. At the end of the day, Dilma did not have the strength to force through the austerity policy which big business and bankers wanted so much. The strength of the Lula phenomenon in power was based on its capacity to apply measures in favour of big capital and at the same time contain the poorest layers of the population with some concessions. The depth of the economic crisis impeded the maintenance of this situation.

31) The corruption scandals involving Petrobras and the financing of electoral campaigns of practically all the parties of the system (including the PMDB of the vice President Michel Temer and the PSDB) were skilfully manipulated with judges and the investigators of the so-called “Lava Jato” operation, playing a protagonist role in ensuring the central incrimination of the PT.

32) Bringing down Dilma became the only way to apply the austerity and counter reforms, and to create a new political climate which could contain the corruption investigation of “Lava Jato” and its potential to destabilise the political situation and the main parties and political regime. The big advantage of the coup and impeachment was that the bourgeois didn’t have to present its programme and attempts to save the corrupt politicians in the other parties in new elections.

33) There was organised and massive resistance to the coup conspiracy of Temer and the leaders of the Congress, including demonstrations of hundreds of thousands on which the majority were not there to defend the government, but to denounce the coup. However the leadership of this movement was always in the hands of the PT and its allies who were totally incapable of leading the movement to victory. Some insisted on defending the government of the indefensible Dilma. Others had already capitulated and looked towards the elections of 2018 and the return of Lula as candidate, as the only possible solution.

34) The only way to make the anti-coup movement successful would have been assuming clear political independence from the government, putting forward a clear programme against neoliberal austerity and in defence of new elections. There was no basis for Dilma to remain in power and the choice was between the farce of impeachment or a massive popular consultation which would create obstacles to the implementation of austerity and counter reforms. These demands could not have been defended by the PT and its allies and the new developing Left (PSOL and the combative social movements) still were not in condition (and in many aspects did not have the political clarity) necessary to put these demands to the forefront with sufficient force.

35) The same applies to the struggle against the illegitimate government of Temer. Despite being an unpopular government, there is an enormous discrediting of the political system. Even the slogan “Temer out” which has the support of the a big majority of the population, can only become a slogan of effective struggle if it is linked to struggle against the attacks of the government, which will be felt deeply by workers and youth.

36) In this struggle, the CWI in Brazil must defend the broadest possible unity in action against the attacks of the government and of the state and municipal governments. At the same time, in this process of resistance, building a Left alternative to the PT s fundamental and its allies. The project of class collaboration of the PT is responsible for the current setbacks for the working class and only a new mass socialist Left can lead the struggle to victory and offer a working class political alternative.

 

Venezuela at the crossroads

37) For years on the Left there was a certain dichotomy between the models of Lula in Brazil and Chavez in Venezuela. Chavismo was radicalised, mainly due to the resistance put up to it by imperialism and the local bourgeoisie, as in the case of the 2002 coup, which was defeated by the masses. Even without an energetic socialist programme and strategy it inspired and motivates a significant part of the working class and poor. In the case of Lula, the orientation was the opposite, in the direction of class collaboration and accommodating to the system.

38) Despite the differences, both models have entered into a profound crisis, each one in its own way, and this puts the necessity of a revolutionary socialist political alternative on the agenda.

39) In Venezuela there is the biggest economic crisis in its history. In 2016, the country will see the third successive year of negative GDP growth, falling by 8% according to predictions of CEPAL. The shortages of goods and services and inflation has exploded. The costs of basic goods rose by 457.5% between September 2015 and 2016 and around 24 minimum wages would be necessary to pay for it. Living conditions are worsening and are comparable to those in war zones. Child mortality in the first year of life has reached 18.6 thousand, compared to 15.4 thousand recorded in Syria.

40) A fundamental factor in this scenario is the international crisis and the end of the commodities boom and especially the price of oil. After 17 years in power, Chavismo managed to achieve a more just distribution of oil income at a time of high prices, but it was not able to alter the raw-material export based character of the Venezuelan economy. The total dependency on oil even for the importing of food and basic goods is fundamental to the crisis and scarcity and generalised dissatisfaction among the population.

41) Moreover, there is the deliberate and conscious position of the bourgeoisie to force political change to further its class interests. The strategists of imperialism and of the Venezuelan bourgeoisie always vacillate between an openly coup position, like that which dominated in 2002, and a strategy of trying to change things from within the institutions, even though it has never renounced open confrontation as a form of pressure.

42) As in Brazil, the Venezuelan ruling class needs a political change in order to go for a solution to the crisis which puts the entire burden onto the working class, provoking a huge loss of the social conquests of the last years. It will therefore use all the institutional means possible, but it will not give up the possibility of resorting to violence or breaks from the institutions as it has before.

43) On the one hand, in the face of the advance of the right wing, the Maduro government, contrary to Dilma in Brazil, is willing to resort to methods of direct confrontation, such as the suspension of the collection of signatures which the right wing is promoting to achieve a recall referendum. However, the main position of the government at the moment, as with Dilma, is to promote concessions to the bourgeoisie and the right wing.

44) The negotiations underway between the Maduro government and the right wing MUD opposition, mediated by the Pope, can offer no perspective of a solution from the point of view of the working class. The result can only be favourable to the right wing and capital. Ultimately, within capitalism, only brutal austerity which punishes the working class can offer a way out.

45) In the Venezuela of Maduro and the PSUV, almost all the dollars which come in to the country go straight to the payment of the foreign debt. Only whatever crumbs are left go to food and medicine. There is no way out of the economic crisis without a confrontation with the interests of big capital. The suspension of the payment of the debt is the initial measure necessary for the rebuilding of the country from the point of view of the majority, the working class. The nationalisation of the key sectors of the economy, under the democratic control and management of the workers, is the unescapable road to an anticapitalist and socialist solution to the crisis.

46) Maduro, however, is not moving in this direction. The impasse in the situation could create the conditions for a regressive institutional rupture. The right wing  has coup-plotting in its  genes, but even the current government could be driven to apply measures of force to maintain power, without this representing a deepening of the revolutionary process in an anticapitalist direction. In reality it could go in the opposite direction.

47) The central task of consequent revolutionaries in Venezuela is to seek to build an alternative Left pole to the bureaucracy which leads the chavista camp. This can only be achieved in the struggle against the right wing, but also putting itself clearly on the side of workers when they confront the Maduro government.

 

The limits of the “new right”

48) Despite the advances of the right, none of the new governments, even those put un place via institutional coups, have gone in the direction of establishing authoritarian or dictatorial regimes as took place in the 60s and 70s. There is no social or political balance of forces that would permit this, when there is no situation of great defeat for the working class. Until now, these governments have not even been able to build a political and social base that could be compared with the Latin American neoliberal parties of the 90s.

49) In the 90s, governments like Cardoso (Brazil), Menem (Argentina), Fujimori (Peru), Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (Bolívia) and others managed to privatise, deregulate, de-nationalise and implement deep neoliberal counter reforms. In order to achieve this, they combined repression against eth workers movement, with a reasonably effective ideological campaign in the context of the ideological world offensive following the collapse of the Stalinist regimes in the USSR and Eastern Europe. It was the epoch of illusions in the market and of distrust in alternatives to capitalism, represented by Stalinism.

50) On this basis, some of these governments won some support for economic policies which ended hyper-inflation which was hitting the poor in many countries. Despite their character, the “Real plan” in Brazil or the “Cavallo plan”in Argentina, for a period, had a degree of popular support, which created in a way a social base favourable to neoliberal policies.

51) The real situation is totally different. The world situation is marked not by a triumph of capitalism but exactly the opposite. The effects of the crisis of 2008 remain present in the real lives and mind of millions of workers. On the one side in reality there has been a rejection of the political forces which were at the head of the centre left governments. At the same time this does not mean a nostalgic support for the former neo-liberal governments. There is not a social base or popular support for any right wing government that openly demands privatisations, cuts, withdrawal of rights and counter reforms. The impact of the crisis has not allowed the right to offer economic and social concessions demanded by people. In reality, exactly the opposite of this is taking place.

52) In relation to this the case of Brazil is emblematic. The fact that the illegitimate President Michel Temer has declared that he will not be a candidate in 2018 means that his main preoccupation is not to win popularity but to implement what big capital demands. This is a profoundly unpopular government and it is not concerned with winning popularity. For this reason it can rush to introduce brutal attacks against the working class as it is already doing. This is the advantage that the government has over Dilma Rouseff (which in some ways had to take into account its social base) and other bourgeois alternative governments which would need to take into account the need to win a popular vote.

53) This indicates a bonapartist and repressive component of this and other governments that we are likely to see in the coming period and already there are clear signs of this. In Brazil a new repressive apparatus is being nationally co-ordinated. This measure was based on emergency legislation introduced by PT governments justified by the World Cup and the Olympic games which included anti-terrorist laws which are now being used against the social movements.

54) At the same time, these unpopular attacks and repressive measures are having a tendency to provoke more popular reaction, struggles and resistance. Despite the attacks, up until now, and despite the reverses there has not been a big historical defeat for the working class and struggles continue.

55) The governing political forces of the right can continue to use the rhetoric of fighting corruption to attack the “left” and propagate the idea that everything linked to “the state” is corrupt. They can gain a base of support amongst the middle class and petty bourgeois for such ideas. Yet at the same time they cannot take effective measures to combat corruption because they are just as implicated in corruption as their predecessors of “centre left” governments.

56) In reality, the right itself fears losing control of the investigations into corruption and seeing them turn against themselves. In Argentina for example, despite all of the accusations made against Cristina Kirchner of the worst aspects of corruption, the same President Macri has not been able to explain his involvement in fraudulent manoeuvres in companies he is involved with making off shore investments to avoid taxes.

57) In Brazil there is no guarantee that operation “Lava Jato” could not implicate the leadership of the Temer government in the National Congress – all of which are involved in schematic corruption. It is for this reason that they have presented to Congress new legislation against corruption which will give an amnesty to those prosecuted for corruption. If this is not done, many see the most extreme possibility, in which Temer loses parliamentary support due to involvement in corruption, at the same time as he faces a popular revolt against his counter reforms. In the case of Temer’s impeachment, a new President would be elected indirectly by the Congress which would give the ruling class the opportunity to impose a “technical” “non- political” government. Many politicians on the right are now wearing the mask of “technical managers”, as is the case of Macri in Argentina or more recently the elected mayor in Brazil’s biggest city. Joa Doria Jr.

58) Ideas and conceptions of a neo-liberal type can gain a certain base of support amongst sections of the middle class and social layers after the failure of the supposedly alternative models presented as “progressive governments”. However, this does not mean a new solid social base of support for counter reforms that are being introduced. There is a wide margin for widespread resistance to reverse this situation. Evidently the ruling class are counting on the indirect collaboration of the trade union leaders and political leadership of the workers.

 

Resistance against the attacks of the right

59) Throughout Latin America there are struggles against the austerity policies that are being applied by governments in reaction to the worsening international crisis. In the first year of Macri’s presidency in Argentina for example was marked by an upturn in social struggles which up to a certain point have prevented the government from applying its programme in its entirety.

60) There were massive mobilisations of public sector workers against lay-offs, many strikes by different layers of workers and a massive unified trade union mobilisation in April against tax increases and lay- offs. A general strike did not take place due to the capitulation of the trade union leaders in negotiations with the government.

61) Michel Temer in Brazil has had to confront massive demonstrations from his first day in the Presidency. There were many street demonstrations but also various waves of occupations of public buildings such as the Ministry of Culture throughout the country and also occupations of schools and universities. A series of national unified mobilisations were convened by the trade union centres – the most recent of them on 11 November which resulted in a paralysation of important sectors and the blockading of motorways and street demonstrations. Another is planned for 25 November which could serve to prepare for the calling of a one day general strike throughout the country.

62) However, after years of de-mobilisation when the PT was in government the previously more combative trade union centres like the CUT, today have lost mobilising and have become extremely bureaucratised and removed from their social base. The most important and determined movements which have struggled against Temer have been from outside the official structures. This was the case in the secondary schools student movement and university movement both of which involved occupations. At this moment more than 1,000 schools and universities are being occupied throughout the country.

63) The depth of the crisis has created a “Greek” type crisis in some regions of the country. In Rio de Janeiro, the state government is seeking to introduce a policy of massive cuts, with wage cuts of state employees and other impending attacks. The response of these workers has been to move to adopt a more radical position. Recently sections of the police have been mobilised and there are cases of the riot police disobeying orders of their commanders and refusing to repress workers’ demonstrations.

64) In Chile, we have seen an important national mobilisation against the Pension Funds and in favour of a social and public pension system. In Mexico there is a real conflagration between sections of workers and the neo-liberal government of Pena Nieto. The struggle of the Mexican teachers has already resulted in more than a dozen deaths and various disappearances.

65) A special mention should be made of the Latin American “feminist autumn”. Working class women are the first to suffer the consequences of austerity and counter reforms. Along with this, a right-wing conservative agenda is being raised as part of the counter offensive by the right wing in various countries. The women’s movement has assumed a special front line role in the struggles in many countries.

66) In Brazil, this was seen in the clearly in the struggle against Temer and corrupt leaders in the Congress, including the arch-conservative Eduardo Cunha, ex-president of the Chamber of Deputies and his conservative agenda to reverse rights won by women. Women took to the streets and played a central role in the fight against Cunha and in the school and university occupations.

67) In Argentina, the massive response of the women in relation to the increase in cases of women being killed was triggered by the killing of a 16 year old young woman. This has been taken up in various countries. The movement, “Not one woman less”, has grown in strength and organised a working women’s stoppage for one hour in numerous work places on 19 October.

 

Colombia and the Peace Agreement

68) In Colombia, the victory of the NO in the referendum on the peace agreement between the government of Juan Manual Santos and the FARC are part of a series of setbacks in this conjuncture that today affects Latin America. The result has increased and strengthened the weight of the political influence of the former right-wing ex-president Alvaro Uribe – the main leader of the NO campaign. Santos was the main leader of the YES campaign, but does not represent a real alternative to Uribe.

69) Santos represents the moderate wing which defends the interests of the ruling class and imperialism. He reflects the interests of big finance capital which is interested in a stabilisation of the Colombian political situation to guarantee their economic interests. Uribe for his part reflects the most truculent landowners and most reactionary sections of the ruling class.

70) Despite there being no doubt about the sympathy of the majority of the population for the idea of a peace agreement that will end decades of conflicts that have caused thousands of deaths and millions of refugees, the costs of the peace process was paid for by the population. This was reflected in the low level of participation. 37% of voters participated in the referendum, one of the lowest level of participation in Colombian history.

71) The end of a civil war without any perspective of a revolutionary victory in working class is in the interests of the working class and will open the road for an effective struggle with the methods of the working class. The government of Santos will continue with its neo-liberal policies and will need to be fought on the streets and in struggles in the work place. The role of the left in the social movements in Colombia is to struggle for an alternative to both Santos and Uribe.

 

Mexico: Struggle and Repression

72) Mexico returned a PRI government in 2012. The PRI had ruled as the traditional party for more than 70 years, and was re-elected after a brief interregnum of governments which were of the right-wing neo-liberal PAN led by Fox and Calderon. The current President, Pena Nieto, rules in one of the most convulsive countries of Latin America.

73) Mexico was brutally affected by the international economic crisis in its’ first years, particularly affected by the slowdown in the US economy. At this moment the decline in the Chinese economy has resulted in the end of the commodities boom. Yet Mexico is more affected by its links to the economy in the north. The disastrous economic and social situation which exists is reflected in the social, trade union and political struggles which are taking place.

74) The war against the drugs cartels unleashed by Calderon and continued by his successors represented a real war against the poor and provoked uncountable violations of human rights. More than 150,000 were killed in what was a nightmare for thousands of Mexican families. Yet, the government was unable to combat the cartels with their organic links to the Mexican state. The emergence of popular militias of self-defence against the cartels and the corrupt agents of the state were repressed by the government with many political prisoners who were leaders of the organisations of popular self-defence.

75) The massacre of Ayotzinapa (in Guerrero state) in 2014, with the disappearance of 43 students who led a demonstration, provoked a national backlash which brutally exposed the repressive nature of the Mexican state, in collusion with organised crime. Another example of the brutal repression was against the teachers organised in the CNTE which organised an important strike against regressive education reforms that lasted for months. In June this year, in Nochixlan (Oaxaca state) the state was responsible for more than 11 deaths of demonstrators on a teachers protest along with many disappeared and arrested.

76) With the degeneration of the PRD, an old split from the PRI to the left, its old leader was and ex-presidential candidate who was impeded from coming to power due to blatant electoral fraud, Lopes Obrador (known as AMLO) launched a new party MORENA. With a left profile, it became the only reference point to challenge the neo-liberal parties and representatives of the oligarchs nationally and saw an important growth in the legislative elections in 2015. MORENA was more an electoral instrument than one of social struggle and of the working class and it did not play a real role in the main struggles in the country.

77) In October of this year, the EZLN and the National congress of Indigenous Peoples (CNI) decided to organise a consultation of its base, about standing a female indigenous Zapatista candidate in the presidential elections of 2018. This represents a big turning point of a progressive character in the political direction of the EZLN, which in general has adopted a politically abstentionist line concentrating on controlling the territories which it controls in Chiapas. From this process it is possible that a new political reference point develops for big sections of those most excluded from Mexican society.

 

Cuba re-establishes relations with the USA

78) There is no doubt that together with the debacle of Chavismo, one of the factors that represents a big historical step backwards for the Latin American left is the advance in capitalist restoration in Cuba. We have already identified that this process was developing rapidly but that it is combined with many contradictions, limits and zig zags in the policy of the regime headed by Raul Castro.

79) The re-establishment of relations with the USA, although in one respect represents an advance for the Cuban people, is part of the strategy of imperialism in the sense that it is being used to defeat the conquests of the revolution in an indirect way that is more efficient than the direct assaults it previously attempted.

80) The economic relations have not yet been established in a pure form, yet there is a tendency by Obama to use the end of the embargo to encourage capitalist restoration in Cuba in this way. At the same time, the USA is clashing with its Chinese rival for influence on the island as in other areas of Latin America.

81) The election of Donald trump as US President will heighten this clash more openly over Cuba. Trump will be more sensitive than Obama to the reactionary sections of the US which have opposed this policy. He made this clear at the end of his campaign addressing the anti-Castro electoral base he has in Miami. Nevertheless the economic and political advantages for the US are clear enough for the strategists of imperialism. At the same time within the Republican Party, Trump was the only candidate that was not categorically opposed to the continuation of Obamas policy and in favour breaking relations with Cuba. He ended declaring that he was in “the middle of the road” between Obama’s policy and those sections of his party which rejected it.

82) From the point of view of the Cuban regime, the situation is not very different. The military manoeuvres and training that have taken place, announced after the US elections could not be misinterpreted. Raul Castro was one of the first to send congratulations to Trump following his victory. The regime will continue investing in the opening up process and re-establishing of relations with the US. Within Cuba, this is likely to develop fears and more open criticism of the consequences of this process.

83) Within this very contradictory process, the election of Trump will be an additional ingredient on the road that can result in the full capitalist restoration in Cuba. The only effective road to reverse the scenario of capitalist restoration and its terrible social effects is a struggle by the working class in defence of the gains of the revolution. The struggle of the working class throughout Latin America against neo-liberalism, capitalism and imperialism also represents a decisive factor for the future of Cuba.

 

Re-organisation of the Latin American left

84) A consequence of the crisis of Lulismo and Chavismo and its variants in Latin America, has opened a space for a new left alternative to these models. The electoral results and growth of PSOL in Brazil and the FIT (Left Workers’ Front) in Argentina are examples of this.

85) There also exist other potential processes which could advance the emergence of a new alternative left. The possibility of an indigenous Zapatista candidate in Mexico is another example.

86) The experience of mass direct struggles, such as the Chilean experience of the NO+AFP Co-ordinating Committee, which has played an important role in re-organising trade union and popular struggles, could have big repercussions politically. There is now room for a new political alternative in Chile, as some recent electoral results in local elections have shown.

87) The re-organisation of the socialist left in countries such as Bolivia, Venezuela or Ecuador and Nicaragua will need to overcome the bureaucratic and authoritarian methods of the political forces which governed in these countries and which, in their crisis, have worked to impede the development of an alternative left.

88) This process of the re-organisation of the left and the social movements could advance and “heat up” as the struggles and resistance against the bourgeois right-wing counter offensive develop.

89) In this scenario, the forces of the CWI in Latin America have two central tasks. Above all one of our roles is to strengthen the resistance to the new attacks on social, workers and democratic rights that is now being unleashed, always seeking to offer the best strategy and tactics for these life and death struggles for thousands of workers, youth, women, black people, indigenous peoples and all the exploited and oppressed.

90) At the same time, it is central that, in this process of struggles, we work to re-build a socialist left that is capable of learning from the lessons and limits and betrayals of the political forces which have governed in many countries in the continent.